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ABSTRACT 
This paper examtnes ss4, 5 and 6 of the New Zealan
d Bill of Rights Act 1990. A 
trilogy of sections referred to as the Bill of Rights' "operatio
nal provisions". 
The writer notes that the application of the operation
al provisions has proved to be 
difficult and examines how the Courts have applied the
 provisions to date. The writer 
concludes that the operational provisions can be said 
to be working, although, this is 
due more to a judicial willingness to make the Bill of 
Rights work rather than by any 
obvious operation of the provisions themselves. In c
oncluding the writer argues for 
the primacy of s5 as a clear, discernable and proven limitati
on clause for the Bill. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footn
otes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 15,000 words. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Operational Sections of the Bill of Rights 
1 
2 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (hereafter referred to as "the Bill of 
Rights" or "the Bill") is divided into three parts. Part III of the Bill contains 
two miscellaneous provisions which, to date, have raised little comment. Part 
II of the Bill sets out the rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill. They are, 
if you like, the glamour provisions of the Bill. 
"They are the stuff of anthems, literature and eulogy. They puff the 
chest and wet the eye. When society grants rights to persons who 
have flouted its most basic rules, it is done m a spirit of generosity. 
This engenders pride, perhaps even a feeling of self- righteousness. It 
expresses the dignity of turning the other cheek. It is the kindness 
of the good Samaritan. It is the embrace of the prodigal son."
1 
Somewhat to the contrary, Part I of the Bill is rather vaguely headed "General 
Provisions". However, it 1s a heading which belies the importance of the 
sections it contains. For it is in Part I of the Bill that the operational 
provisions2 of the Bill are to be found. These are the provisions that tell you 
how the Bill of Rights actually works. Who the Bill applies to and how it fits 
into our legal system. 
paper. 
It is these provisions which are the focus of this 
For ease of reference, ss4, 5 and 6 of the Bill are set out below: 
"4. Other enactments not affected- No court shall, in relation to 
any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the 
commencement of this Bill of Rights), -
DM Paciocco "The Pragmatic Application of Fundamental Principles: Keeping a 
Rouges' Charter Respectable" (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, August 
1992) at 7. 
An expression used by commentators to describe the prov1s1ons of Part I of 
the Bill, rn particular, ss 4, 5 and 6. For example PA Joseph in 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, The Law Book Company 
Ltd, 1993, Sydney at 851 and PT Rishworth in "Two Comments on Ministry of 
Transport v Noort" (1992) NZ Recent L. Rev. at 189. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
2 
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly 
repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or 
ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment; 
by reason only that the provision 1s inconsistent with any provision of 
this Bill of Rights. 
5. Justified limitations- Subject to section 4 of this Bill of 
Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
6. Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred-
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with 
the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning 
shall be preferred to any other meaning." 
As it has happened, the application of the operational provisions has proved to
 
be difficult. Despite being the subject of a leading judgment of the Court o
f 
Appeal,3 judicial opinion on the role of the vanous provisions has been
 
divided. Commentators on the topic do not agree.
4 The law in this area 
remains far from settled. As Cooke P said: 
5 
"It seems to me that the last word on the interrelationship of the 
four6 sections 1s far from having been said. 
predicted that the debate will continue." 
It may safely be 
Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260, see Part IV of this paper 
For example, c.f. F M Brookfield "Freedom: the New Zealand Bill of Right
s 
Act 1990" [1993] NZ Recent LR 288 and P A Rishworth "Two Comments on
 
Ministry of Transport v Noort" [1992] NZ Recent LR 189 
Temese v Police (1992) 9 CRNZ 425 at 427 
The "four" sections Cooke P refers to are ss4, 5, 6 and 7. It is suggested
 
that s7 1s more of a stand alone provision and 1s not discussed in thi
s 
paper. However, see P. Fitzgerald "Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill o
f 
Rights Act 1990: A very practical power or a well intentioned nonsense
" 
(1992) 22 VUWLR 135 
3 
The purpose of this paper is to analysise the subject of the debate and revie
w 
the arguments to date. It does not purport to be the "last word" on
 the 
interrelationship of the operational provisions. That, of course, will come fro
m 
the Courts, not from a commentator. But it 1s hoped that, in some small wa
y, 
it may contribute to the debate. In particular, in support of the argument fo
r 
the primacy of s5. 
B. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
7 
In order to understand some of the difficulties that bedevil the operation
al 
provisions of the Bill, it is necessary to understand something of the histor
y 
of the Bill. It is a history not without controversy. 
The Bill of Rights came into force on 25 September 1990. How New Zealan
d 
came to have a Bill of Rights is in itself interesting. Certainly the Bill
 did 
not result from any particular constitutional crisis. Nor was there any p
ublic 
clamour for a Bill of Rights. As a Labour Party political measure:7 
"It must be said there was no great enthusiasm for it by Labour MPs 
then or later." 
Rather it seems clear that the New Zealand Bill owes its genesis to Geoffre
y 
Palmer's personal interest in the subject:
8 
"On becoming Minister of Justice, I set up a group of officials to 
work intensively on the production of a high quality white paper 
presenting a draft Bill of Rights and the arguments for it." 
After the White Paper was published it was referred to Parliament's Justic
e 
and Law Reform select committee. While there was little discernable in
terest 
in a Bill of Rights prior to Sir Geoffrey's initiative, the White Paper certainl
y 
provoked public comment. 
G Palmer New Zealand's Constitution 10 Crisis, John Mcindoe, 1992, Dunedi
n 
at 52 
S Ibid at 53. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
4 
The select committee received four hundred and thirty one submissions on the 
draft Bill and heard submissions over a period of two years. The majority of 
the submissions were against the draft Bill. While there were many 
miscellaneous submissions,9 two features of the draft Bill attracted the most 
criticism. They were, first , that the Bill was to be entrenched as the supreme 
law of New Zealand. 10 And , second, the inclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi.
11 
By the time the select committee reported back to the House the National 
Party in Opposition had decided that it was opposed to the Bill. Effectively 
that spelt the end to an entrenched Bill of Rights. Obviously, such a 
fundamental constitutional change could not be made law by a simple majority 
in the House. Accordingly, the select committee recommended a Bill of Rights 
Act, similar to the Bill of Rights drafted in the White Paper, but to be 
enacted as an ordinary Act of Parliament. In addition, the provisions relating 
to the Treaty of Waitangi were deleted. 
That the Bill of Rights was to become law as only an ordinary statute must 
have been disappointing to its proponents. Much was made of the Bill ' s 
reduced status as an ordinary statute. The National Party ID Opposition 
referred to the Bill as a "Clayton's version of a Bill of Rights"
12 and 
legislating by "bumper sticker" .13 Academic commentators have called the Bill 
"watered down", 14 "debilitated"15 and "disembowel [ ed] ".
16 The New Zealand 
Herald's editorial of 12 October 1989 referred to a "pale and lonely bill". And, 
For a critical summary of the submissions, see ibid 53 -56. 
Clauses 1 and 28 of the draft Bill. 
Clause 4 of the draft Bill. 
NZPD Vol. 509 (1990) 2800 and 2802 (P.East) 
NZPD Vol.509 (1990) at 2801 (P.East) quoting D Dugdale on behalf of the NZ 
Law Society. 
P Rishworth "The Potential of the NZ Bill of Rights" (1990) NZLJ 68. 
D Paciocco "The NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990: Curial Cures for a Debilitated 
Bill" (1990) NZ Recent L. Rev. 351. 
D Paciocco "The Pragmatic Application of Fundamental Principles: Keeping a 
Rogues' Charter Respectable" Legal Research Foundation August 1992. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
5 
even the Court of Appeal has referred to the Bill ' s history as being "far from 
unequivocal. "17 
Perhaps in keeping with its somewhat discredited beginning, initial references 
to the Bill were cautious. "[I]n interpreting and applying the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act it is well to proceed gradually. "
18 However, there began to 
emerge from the Court of Appeal , 10 particular, "an increasingly confident 
jurisprudence11 19 which after the decision in R v Butcher
20 moved Shaw & 
Butler to exclaim that the Bill of Rights "comes alive".
21 However, "that was 
not to say it was dead", 22 indeed, it was not even moribund. 
Even as an ordinary Act of Parliament the Bill of Rights always had the 
potential to be a significant constitutional document.
23 But perhaps not even 
the most "dyed in the wool " enthusiasts of the Bill could have quite foreseen 
what today the Bill of Rights has become. If Butler is correct, then the Bill 
applies to private common law litigation
24 which surely was not intended.
25 
And in Baigent v Attorney-General
26 the Court of Appeal has "invent[ed] a 
new concept of public law compensation"
27 for breaches of the Bill. Daily our 
Baigent v Attorney-General, Unreported, 29 July 1994, Court of Appeal, CA 
207 /93, Hardie Boys J at 14. 
Cooke P in Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 274. See also 
R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257 at 264 
A Shaw & A S Butler "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Comes Alive (I)" (1991) 
NZLJ 400 
[1992] 2 NZLR 257 
n19 
P Rishworth "Ironing Out The Creases in the Bill of Rights Act" Continuing 
Legal Education Programme of the Auckland District Law Society, August, 1993 
at 9.32 
In particular, n14 
AS Butler "The New Zealand Bill of Rights and private common law litigation" 
(1991) NZLJ 261 
For example, the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee supported the 
confinement of the Bill to "public" action: see Interim Report of the 
Justice and Law Reform Committee Inquiry into the White Paper. A Bill of 
Rights for NZ (2nd sess. 41 Part 1987) at 25 
Unreported, 29 July 1994, Court of Appeal , CA 207/93 
J Hodder in The Capital Letter Vol 17 No 28 at 1 
6 
Courts hear submissions on the application of the Bill of Rights. There are 
now hundreds of Court decisions on the Bill. Many of these decisions have 
been reported. Indeed, a separate senes of law reports featuring cases on the 
Bill has been published28. Truly, it can be said that the Bill could become the 
new dynamic in litigation proceedings over the next few years. The Bill of 
Rights is more than alive, it is "up and moving". 
C. Categories of Bill of Rights Cases 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
It should be noted at the outset that many of the Bill of Rights cases do not 
invoke Part I of the Bill at all. These sort of cases usually involve a 
complaint that the state (usually the police) has carried out some certain 
conduct rn breach of the Bill. Most of the s23(1)(b) cases fall into this 
category. Other examples include the cases on the meaning of arrest and 
detention (e.g. R v Butcher29, R v Goodwin
30 and R v Goodwin (No 2)31 ) and 
the cases on unreasonable search and seizure (e.g. R v Jeffries
32 and R v 
Davis33). 
While these cases can raise issues of interpretation of considerable difficulty, 
they are relatively straightforward. They require the Courts to interpret the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights itself. But they do not require the Courts to 
interpret the provisions of the Bill against an apparently inconsistent statute. 
Necessarily, such an exercise requires the Courts to apply the operational 
provisions in Part I of the Bill. 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Reports ("NZBORR") 
[1992) 2 NZLR 257 
[1993) 2 NZLR 153 
[1993)2 NZLR 390 
[1994) 1 NZLR 290 
Unreported, 30 July 1993, Court of Appeal, CA 306/93 
7 
II. THE ORIGINS OF SECTIONS 4, 5 AND 6 
34 
35 
Why are the operational provisions of the Bill of Rights so difficult? Surely, 
be as they should not be. 
straightforward as possible. 
Ideally, the operation of our Bill should 
And, as will be discussed, it would seem that a 
number of the difficulties caused by the wording of the three sections, that 
have so confounded the judiciary, 34 could have been avoided. Rather humbly, 
the cause of the difficulties, at least in part, lies with the Bill ' s checkered 
origins. 
It will be recalled that the Bill was originally drafted to be entrenched as the 
supreme law of New Zealand. Unashamably, much of the draft Bill followed 
the wording of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("the Canadian 
Charter") which 1n turn drew on the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights ("the International Covenant") and the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the European 
Convention"). 
Clearly, s5 (or clause 3 as it was then) was based on sl of the Canadian 
Charter. Typical of declarations of human rights, the rights m the Canadian 
Charter are not absolute. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter provided a 
general limitations clause as follows: 
"The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out m it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society." 
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter has been described as: 
[the) mechanism through which the courts are to determine the 
j usticiability of particular issues that come before it. 
11 35 
In particular in Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992) 3 NZLR 260, see Part 
IV of this paper 
Operation Dismantle v R (1985) 18 DLR ( 4th) 481 at 518 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
8 
Therefore, it was entirely appropriate to include on equivalent section to sl o
f 
the Canadian Charter in an entrenched Bill of Rights for New Zealand. 
It 
provided the criteria whereby the Courts would strike down offendin
g 
legislation. But the Courts have no such role in a Bill of Rights enacted on
ly 
as an ordinary statute. No longer is the Bill supreme law. Obviously, th
e 
drafters of the Bill wished to make the Bill ' s reduced status clear by makin
g 
s5 subject to s4. But it is not at all obvious what is the role of a "reasonab
le 
limits" section like s5 rn an unentrenched Bill of Rights. The only expre
ss 
indicia as to why s5 was retained can be found rn explanatory note (d) to th
e 
Bill. That is, to confirm that the rights and freedoms in the Bill are n
ot 
absolute. Why the legislature should think that that was necessary 1s bizarr
e. 
The Courts have long recognised this as "elementary".
36 In the event, s5 
remains, as Hardie Boys J nicely understated it, "a difficult provision".
37 
Unlike s5, s6 has no equivalent in the Canadian Charter. It can be foun
d rn 
the original draft of the Bill but in a somewhat different form . As clause 2
3 
it expressly required the Courts not to strike down legislation where there wa
s 
a possible interpretation of an enactment that would be consistent with th
e 
Bill of Rights . 38 There was strong opposition to the inclusion of a clause lik
e 
clause 23 in the Bill. Elkind and Shaw
39 argued that it would create a 
"presumption of consistency40 and undermine the scope of clause 3 (section 5). 
When the decision was made to proceed with a Bill of Rights Act enacted on
ly 
as an ordinary Act of Parliament, clauses 3 and 23 necessarily had to b
e 
revisited. Essentially, four changes
41 were made: 
(i) a new s4 was drafted to confirm the Bill ' s reduced status as a
n 
ordinary Act of Parliament; and 
McCarthy J in Melser v Police [1967] NZLR 437 at 446. See n67 of this paper 
Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 287 
"A Bill of Rights for New Zealand", A White Paper Government Paper 1985 a
t 
para 10.180 
A Standard for Justice: A Critical Commentary on the Proposed Bill of Righ
ts 
for New Zealand, Oxford University Press, 1986, Oxford 
Ibid at 137 
Other changes were made but they are not relevant here. 
9 
(ii) clause 3 became s5 and was made subject to s4; and 
(iii) clause 23 was redrafted to provide a rule of interpretation; and 
(iv) the redrafted clause 23 was moved into Part I of the Bill adjacent
 to 
ss4 and 5 and became s6. 
Clumped together as ss4, 5 and 6, the three sections are easily identifiable as
 
the operational or mechanical provisions of the Bill. But what is not 
at all 
clear is how the three sections interrelate with each other. 
untidy and confusing. Rishworth called it an "imbroglio. "
42 
The result is 
ill. AN ANALYSIS OF SECTIONS 4, 5 AND 6 
A. Section 4 
42 
43 
Section 4 is an uncompromising section. "[I]t is more cleaver than scalpel.
"43 
On a plain reading, it provides that where there is inconsistency between
 a 
provision of an enactment and the Bill of Rights, the enactment prevails. A
ny 
argument that the Bill should prevail is eliminated. There is no discretion a
nd 
no criteria. Any enactment, no matter how unreasonable or unjustified, w
ill 
prevail over the Bill. 
Section 4 lists what the Courts must not do in such circumstances. A ju
dge 
must not hold the enactment to be 10 any repealed, revoked, invalid 
or 
ineffective. Nor may a judge decline to apply the enactment. Th
us, 
fundamental as the rights and freedoms in the Bill might be, s4 confir
ms 
parliamentary supremacy over the Bill. 
n22 at 9.36 
n16 at 9 
10 
1. "Enactment" 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
In order to determine the scope of s4, it is necessary to define the ter
m 
"enactment". The Bill provides no such definition. Nor does the Ac
ts 
Interpretation Act 1924. 
There is no doubt that enactment includes a section or part of a section of a
n 
Act of Parliament.44 But can the rights and freedoms m the Bill be overborn
e 
by subordinate legislation? The answer would seem to be yes. In Black 
v 
Fulcher, 45 the Court of Appeal found:
46 
11 'Enactment' 1s not defined m the Acts Interpretation Act, though 
frequently used in the Act. We think that in general (whether there 
are any exceptions need not now be considered) and in particular in 
s20(h) [of the Acts Interpretation Act] it is used as a convenient and 
succinct term to embrace any Act or rules or regulations thereunder 
and any provision thereof." 
There may well be a case to argue that the Bill of Rights should be a
n 
exception to the general rule laid down by the Court of Appeal. However, a
n 
intention to include subordinate legislation is further shown by the use of th
e 
words "made" and "revoked" in s4.
47 
As the jurisprudence on the Bill of Rights has developed, it has become "pa
rt 
of the fabric of New Zealand law.
11 48 In the circumstances, it seems 
altogether inappropriate that subordinate legislation should be able to preva
il 
over the Bill. 
Munro v Auckland City [1967) NZLR 873 
[1988) 1 NZLR 417 
Ibid at 419 
As opposed to "passed" and "replaced" which is terminology more consisten
t 
with Acts 
Cooke P in Baigent v Attorney - General, Unreported, 23 July 1994, Court o
f 
Appeal, CA 207/93 at 11 
11 
2. The Effect of Section 4 
The effect of s4 is obvious enough. And, not surprisingly, argu
ments have 
developed that seek to limit s4's applicability.
49 But s4 has been used by the 
Courts to produce results that perhaps few would argue with. In T
V3 Network 
Services Ltd v R50, TV3 wished to screen a television documen
tary about 
incest. The programme was to feature a family where the fat
her of five 
daughters (since grown up) had been found guilty of rape and sexu
al abuse of 
his daughters when they had been children. TV3 intended to inc
lude in the 
programme information that may have identified the daughters. 
Of the five 
daughters, two objected to publication, two consented and the 
fifth gave 
qualified consent. Later, the fifth daughter changed her mind an
d withdrew 
her qualified consent. TV3 applied to the Court for permission to
 screen the 
programme under s139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985. Section 1
39 prohibits 
the publication of the names of offenders and victims in specified 
sexual cases 
where the publication is likely to lead to the identification of 
the victims. 
The Court of Appeal found :51
 
"It is true that freedom of expression, both by the media and in 
this 
case by the two consenting sisters, 1s a factor the importance 
of 
which is underlined by s14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990, 
but 
m the circumstances of the present case freedom of express10n is
 to 
be subordinated to the public policy indicated by Parliament un
der 
s139(2). By virtue of s4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
that 
policy must prevail over s14.
11 52 
3. "Decline to Apply" 
49 
50 
51 
52 
While the effect of s4(a) of the Bill is obvious enough, s4(b) is a
 little more 
difficult. It would seem that declining to apply an enactment under
 s4(b) is to 
In particular, J B Elkind "On the limited applicability of sect
ion 4, Bill 
of Rights Act" (1993) NZLJ 111 
[1993] 3 NZLR 421 
Ibid at 423 
The writer argues that the Court could have equally reached the 
same result 
using s5, see Part VB of this paper 
12 
be something different from holding it to be impliedly r
epealed etc. under 
s4(a). Its application will be where a provision in an enactm
ent is found to be 
inconsistent with a provision of the Bill on the facts of a 
particular case. In 
such a case the Court might find , short of holding the
 enactment to be 
repealed or invalid, on the facts of the case, the enactm
ent to be of no 
application. Section 4(b) forbids the Courts from taking suc
h an approach. It 
well illustrates the difference between the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights and the 
Canadian Charter. In R v Rao
53 slO(l)(a) of the Canadian Narcotic Control 
Act authorised police officers to enter and search premises 
without a warrant. 
However, s8 of the Canadian Charter provides that "Everyon
e has the right to 
be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. " The 
Ontario Court of 
Appeal held that slO(l)(a) was not unconstitutional but it 
was inoperative to 
the extent that it was inconsistent with s8. Martin JA said:
54 
"In my opinion, slO(l)(a) is inoperative to the extent that it
 authorises 
the search of a person's office without a warrant, in the 
absence of 
circumstances which made the obtaining of a warrant impracticabl
e;" 
Accordingly, the Court declined to apply slO(l)(a) rn circum
stances where the 
obtaining of a warrant in advance was practicable. Such a 
finding would not 
be available to the New Zealand courts because of s4(b). 
4. Is Section 4 Necessary? 
53 
54 
55 
56 
Section 4 can be seen as a device to eliminate any argum
ent that, even as 
only an ordinary Act of Parliament, the Bill prevailed ove
r other legislation. 
The drafters of the unentrenched version of the Bill may we
ll have been aware 
that there was Canadian authority to support such an arg
ument. In R V 
Drybones55 the Supreme Court of Canada held that s94 of th
e Canadian Indian 
Act, which made it an offence for an Indian to be intoxic
ated off a reserve, 
was rendered inoperative by the unentrenched Canadian Bill 
of Rights56. This 
(1984) 46 OR (2d) 80 
Ibid at 110 
(1970) 9 DLR 473 
8 - 9 Elizabeth II, c.44. As distinct from the Canadian Charter
 of Rights 
and Freedoms 1982 
13 
was because the Indian Act denied an Indian "equality be
fore the law" as 
guaranteed by s(l)(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. 
57 Brookfield58 argued 
that, in any event, s4 was unnecessary because the New Z
ealand Bill lacked 
the "particular obstante formula" which enabled the Canadian 
Supreme Court in 
Drybones to hold legislation inoperative to the extent of 
inconsistency with 
the Canadian Bill of Rights. 
59 And, further, Dry bones was an exceptional 
case. The Canadian Supreme Court never again held a legis
lative provision as 
inoperative under the Canadian Bill of Rights.
60 
Accordingly, the inclusion of s4 can be seen as an exampl
e of a "belts and 
braces" approach. 
B. Section 5 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
Section 5's role 10 our unentrenched Bill of Rights is an enig
ma. Copied as it 
is from sl of the Canadian Charter, it appears to be the 
cornerstone section 
of the Bill. However, as will be discussed, there is impressiv
e judicial dicta to 
say that the role of s5 is limited and peripheral.
61 What is certain about s5 
though is that it makes clear that the rights and freedoms
 contained 10 the 
Bill are not absolute. With some of the rights and freedoms 
in the Bill, this is 
implicit from the wording of the Bill itself. Such as the 
right to be secure 
against "unreasonable" search or seizure,
62 the right not to "arbitrarily" 
arrested or detained, 63
 the right to be released on "reasonable" terms and 
conditions, 64 the right to "adequate" time and facilities to pre
pare a defence65 
(1970) 9 DLR 473 at 484, 485 
See (1990) NZ Recent L. Rev 223 at 224 and (1991) NZ Recent L. 
Rev 253 at 264 
I.e. s2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights included the wo
rds "unless it is 
expressly declared by an Act of Parliament of Canada tha
t it shall operate 
notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights." 
Despite the argument being made, for example, see A.G . v
 Lavell (1973) 38 
DLR (3d) 481, R v Burnshine (1974) 44 DLR (3d) 584, MacK
ay v R (1980) 114 
DLR (3d) 393 but note the minority judgments 
See Part IV F and G of this paper 
s21 
s22 
s24(b) 
65 
66 
67 
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and the right to be tried without "undue" delay.
66 But most of the rights and 
freedoms in the Bill are drafted in the broadest of terms w
ith no limitations. 
Section 5 then provides the criteria whereby the Courts must
 decide what is to 
be the balance between an individual's right and freedom 's 
versus the interests 
of society as a whole. 
There is nothing particularly new in this function for the Co
urts. Long before 
ss5 and 14 of the Bill of Rights were enacted, McCarthy J said:
67 
s24(d) 
s25(b) 
"Unquestionably, freedom of opinion, including the right 
to protest 
against political decisions, is now accepted as a fundamen
tal human 
right in any modern society which deserves to be called 
democratic. 
Its general acceptance is one of the most precious of our 
individual 
freedoms. It needed no Charter of the United Nations to
 make it 
acceptable to us; it has long been part of our way of lif
e. But a 
democracy 1s compounded of many different freedoms, some
 of which 
conflict with others, and the right of protest, Ill par
ticular, if 
exercised without restraint may interfere with other people's
 rights of 
privacy and freedom from molestation. Freedom of speech, f
reedom of 
behaviour, academic freedom, none of these is absolute. Th
e purposes 
of a democratic society are only made practicable by accep
ting some 
limitations on absolute individual freedoms. 
rather elementary. 
All this, of course, 1s 
The task of the law is to define the limitations which our s
ociety, for 
its social health, puts on such freedoms. Sometimes the la
w defines 
with precision the boundaries of these limitations; often the
 definition 
is stated only in general terms. In these latter cases, the C
ourts must 
lay down the boundaries themselves, bearing in mind that fre
edoms are 
of different qualities and values and that the higher 
and more 
important should not be unduly restricted in favour of low
er or less 
important ones. " 
Melser v Police [1967] NZLR 437 at 445, 446 
15 
1. Limited Application of Section 5? 
68 
69 
70 
Any application of s5 will depend on how widely t
he scope of a particular 
right or freedom is defined by the Courts at the ou
tset. This point is well 
illustrated by the Canadian cases on the application 
of sl of the Canadian 
Charter. As Richardson J observed m Ministry of
 Transport v Noort 
("Noort"):68 
"Section 5 1s largely derived from the Canadian C
harter and the 
Canadians in turn drew on the International Covenan
t on Civil and 
Political Rights and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
Decisions under the Canadian provision and ot
her comparable 
provisions are likely to provide much useful guidance 
to New Zealand 
Courts in the interpretation and application of this key prov
ision. " 
An example of where a right was interpreted widely
 and thereby fell to be 
determined by sl of the Canadian Charter is Irwin To
y Ltd v A.G. Quebec.
69 
At issue was the validity of ss248 and 249 of the Qu
ebec Consumer Protection 
Act which prohibited commercial advertising directed to
 children under the age 
of thirteen. The Supreme Court of Canada held tha
t commercial advertising 
was covered by s2(b) of the Charter which guarantees
 (inter alia) freedom of 
expression and ss248 and 249 infringed s2(b). Therefo
re, the Court turned to 
the question of whether ss248 and 249 were saved by 
sl of the Charter. The 
majority of the Court said yes. The purpose of ss248
 and 249 was to protect 
children who were a vulnerable group. The Court conclude
d:70 
"In sum, the evidence sustains the reasonableness of 
the legislature's 
conclusion that a ban on commercial advertising dire
cted to children 
was the minimal impairment of free expression con
sistent with the 
pressing and substantial goal 
manipulation through such advertising." 
(1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 283 
(1989] 1 SCR 927 
Ibid at 999 
of protecting children against 
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However, the point 1s that the Court' s finding that co
mmercial advertising was 
covered by s2(b) of the Charter was a generous o
ne. Indeed, there was 
Canadian authority to the contrary.
71 If the Court had found that commercial 
advertising was not covered by s2(b) , no analysis un
der sl would have been 
necessary. 
An example of the other extreme is the Supreme Cour
t of Canada's decision in 
Reference Re Workers' Compensation Act 1983 (Nfld)
.72 At issue was the 
validity of ss32 and 34 of the Newfoundland Wor
kers' Compensation Act. 
These sections denied to an injured worker the ri
ght to sue his or her 
employer in tort. It was argued that ss32 and 34
 violated s15(1) of the 
Canadian Charter which provides: 
"Every individual is equal before and under the law a
nd has the right 
to the equal protection and equal benefit of th
e Jaw without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
 based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age
 or mental or 
physical disability." 
The Court delivered a one paragraph judgment dismis
sing the argument. The 
Court found that the situation of work-related accid
ent victims did not fall 
within any of the listed grounds of discrimination in s
15(1) and therefore there 
was no violation. Accordingly, that was the end of th
e appeal and no analysis 
under sl of the Charter was necessary. 
2. Onus 
71 
72 
73 
It is now well established that a person invoking the
 Bill of Rights has the 
initial evidential burden to show, on the balance of pr
obabilities, that a breach 
of the Bill has occurred.
73 If this evidential onus is discharged, the evidential 
burden then shifts to the Crown.7
4 The onus on the Crown is to show that 
For example Re Klein and Law Society of Upper Canada (1
985) 50 OR (2d)118 
[1989) 1 SCR 922 
R v Te Kira [1993] 3 NZLR 257 at 276. Also R v Dob
ler [1993) 1 NZLR 431 at 
438 and R v Jeffries [1994) 1 NZLR 290. 
74 Ibid 
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the alleged breach did not rn fact occur. Or, if see
king to rely on s5, the 
onus 1s on the Crown to show that the substantive 
requirements of s5 are 
satisfied. 75 They are: 
1) is the limitation reasonable? 
2) is the limitation prescribed by law? 
3) can the limitation be demonstrably justified rn
 a free and democratic 
society? 
Typically, the Canadian courts have considered quest
ions 1 and 3 together. 
And in Noort, Richardson J, the only Court of Appeal 
judge to really apply s5, 
followed that approach.7
6 
3. Reasonable limits ... demonstrably justified in a free
 and democratic society 
75 
76 
77 
78 
The Canadian courts have developed over a number of
 decisions, a test for the 
operation of these questions. It has become known 
as the "Oakes test" after 
the case of R v Oakes
77 where the test originated. In Oakes the Supreme 
Court of Canada considered s8 of the Canadian Nar
cotic Control Act which 
reversed the traditional onus of proof, placing on the 
accused person the onus 
to disprove that he or she did not have a narco
tic for the purpose of 
trafficking. Section 8 clearly violated the guarantee
 to the presumption of 
innocence in sll(d) of the Canadian Charter. In the 
circumstances of such a 
blatant case, the Court laid down an extremely struct
ured test for sl of the 
Canadian Charter. The Oakes test required the Crown
 to satisfy the court, on 
the balance of probabilities, that the limitation on the right 
or freedom was:78 
Richardson J in Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992]
 3 NZLR 260 at 283. 
This 1s consistent with the Canadian position, e.g. 
R v Butler (1990) 50 
C.C.C. (3rd) 97 at 119 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 283 
(1986) 1 SCR 103 
Ibid 
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1) prescribed by law; 
2) that the legislative objective which the lim
itation IS designed to 
promote bears on a pressing and substantial concern, and 
3) that the means chosen to attain those object
ives are proportional or 
appropriate to the ends. This generally requires: 
a) the limiting measures must be carefully designe
d and rationally 
connected to the objective; 
b) they must impair the right as little as possible, and
 
c) their effects must not so severely trench on
 the right that 
the legislative objective, albeit important, Is nev
ertheless 
outweighed by the abridgment of rights. 
The Oakes test has proved to work well in the crim
inal law field79 but in 
other areas there has been concern about the appro
priateness of the courts 
effectively reviewing the policy and decisions of the 
legislature. Accordingly, 
the Oakes test has undergone a number of restatem
ents and, in particular, 
there has been a retreat from criteria 3(a) and 3(b).
80 
Indeed, in Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia
,81 a case about equality 
rights under s15 of the Canadian Charter, some of th
e Supreme Court judges 
mooted a different test for s15, suggesting that th
e Oakes test was not 
appropriate. 
More importantly, in the New Zealand context, was R
ichardson J's adoption of 
the Oakes test as restated in Re A Reference re 
Public Service Employee 
Relations Act [1987] 1 SCR 313:
82 
79 n16 at 8.11.129. 
80 
81 
82 
Edwards Books and Art Ltd v R [1986] 2 SCR 17
3 is commonly cited as 
authority for the relaxing of the Oakes test 
[1989] 1 SCR 143 
Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 283. 
83 
84 
85 
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"The constituent elements of any sl inquiry are as fol
lows. First, the 
legislative objective, in pursuit of which the measures
 in question are 
implemented, must be sufficiently significant to warr
ant overriding a 
constitutionally guaranteed right: it must be related to 
'concerns which 
are pressing and substantial rn a free and dem
ocratic society'. 
Second, the means chosen to advance such an ob
jective must be 
reasonable and demonstrably justified rn a free and de
mocratic society. 
This requirement of proportionality of means to en
ds normally has 
three aspects: a) there must be a rational connecti
on between the 
measures and the objective they are to serve; b) the 
measures should 
impair as little as possible the right or freedom in q
uestion; and, c) 
the deleterious effects of the measures must be justifi
able in light of 
the objective which they are to serve.
1183 
Richardson J emphasised that rn its application to s5
, the Oakes test (as 
restated) must be modified to reflect the status of the 
New Zealand Bill, as an 
ordinary act of Parliament and an abridging rnquiry
 under s5 will involve 
consideration of all economic, administrative and social imp
lications.84 
A balancing exercise is required weighing: 
"(1) the significance in the particular case of the valu
es underlying 
the Bill of Rights Act; 
(2) the importance of the public interest of the 
intrusion on the 
particular right protected by the Bill of Rights Act; 
(3) the limits sought to be placed on the applica
tion of the Act 
provision in the particular case; 
(4) the effectiveness of the intrusion rn protecti
ng the interests 
put forward to justify those limits.
1185 
[1987] 1 SCR 313 at 373, 374 
Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 283 
Ibid at 284 
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4. A Free and Democratic Society 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
What is a free and democratic society? And, is 
New Zealand one? As to the 
second question, in Federated Farmers of New Z
ealand & Ors v New Zealand 
Post Ltd,86 McGechan J said:
87 
"(The assumption seems to be that New Zealan
d presently is a free 
and democratic society, and the phrase no doubt 
is to be read 10 that 
light)" 
Of course not all would agree with McGecha
n J's assumption. "Political 
philosophers offer competing conceptions of freedo
m and democracy with which 
lawyers and judges have by and large only a 
passing acquaintance. "
88 As 
Justice Wilson goes on to ask, how are jud
ges to identify the essential 
characteristics of a free and democratic society?
89 
In the writer's view, the Courts should not make 
such an assumption. It is 
not helpful to consider what New Zealand presen
tly is. Rather, New Zealand 
The Chief Justice of 
is to be free and democratic. Whatever that m
eans. 
Canada in R v Oakes9
0 offered this:91 
"The court must be guided by the values and pr
inciples essential to a 
free and democratic society which I believe em
body, to name but a 
few, respect for the inherent dignity of the huma
n person, commitment 
to social justice and equality, accommodation o
f a wide variety of 
beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, an
d faith in social and 
political institutions which enhance the participati
on of individuals and 
Unreported, 1 December 1992, High Court, Wellington
 Registry, CP 661/92 
Ibid at 56 
Madam Justice Wilson "The Charter of Right
s and Freedoms" (1985) 50 
Saskatchewan L.Rev. 169 at 173 
Ibid 
[1986] 1 SCR 103 
Ibid at 136 
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groups 10 society. The underlying values and pri
nciples of a free and 
democratic society are the genesis of the 
rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate stan
dard against which a 
limit on a right or freedom must be shown, des
pite its effect, to be 
reasonable and demonstrably justified." 
The inclusion of the words a free and democ
ratic society 1s to refer the 
Courts to the very purpose for which the Bill wa
s enacted. It is nothing less 
than "the kind of society [New Zealanders] want to liv
e in."92 
5. Prescribed by law 
when s5 does arise for consideration the phras
e "prescribed by 
law" will be important."
93 
(i) Accessibility 
Section 5 requires that the limitation of any right
 or freedom in the Bill must 
be prescribed by law. If the limitation is not
 prescribed by law then, no 
matter how reasonable that limitation may be, s5 will n
ot be complied with. 
In Noort Richardson J explained that the requi
rement that any limit be 
prescribed by law "ensures that if rights are to 
be limited then those limits 
should be imposed by law so that they are
 adequately identifiable and 
accessible by members of the public, and further 
are formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable citizens to regulate their 
conduct and to foresee the 
consequences which a given action may entail.
"94 As authority for this 
rationale of accessibility, in Noort, both Cooke P 
and Richardson J referred to 
the famous Sunday Times case, in the European Co
urt of Human Rights, Sunday 
Times v United Kingdom.
95 In this case, between 1958 and 1961, a company 
92 n88 
93 
94 
95 
Cooke P in Ministry of Transport v 
Richardson J considered that s5 
see Part IV H of this paper 
Ibid at 283 
(1979)58 ILR 491 
Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 272. 
did anse for consideration 10 
In Noort 
that case, 
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named Distillers Company (Distillers) manufactured and
 marketed drugs 
containing thalidomide. The drugs were prescribed as s
edatives for pregnant 
women. Thereafter, a considerable number of women who h
ad been prescribed 
the drug gave birth to babies suffering severe deformities. 
Legal proceedings 
alleging negligence and claiming damages were issued ag
ainst Distillers on 
behalf of the parents of some of the children. Event
ually a settlement 
involving the establishment of a trust fund for the childr
en was negotiated. 
However, a number of the affected parents did not agree
 to the negotiated 
terms. In 1972 the Sunday Times published an article exami
ning the settlement 
proposals and described them as "grotesquely out of proport
ion to the injuries 
suffered". The article also criticised the English law on d
amages and urged 
Distillers to make a better offer. The article also stated tha
t a further article 
would be published tracing how the tragedy had occurred. 
The Attorney-General sought and obtained an injunction agai
nst the publication 
of the second article on the ground it was in contempt of c
ourt. The Sunday 
Times appealed the injunction to the Court of Appeal 
who removed it. 
However, m turn, the Attorney-General appealed and th
e injunction was 
restored, albeit in a modified format, by the House of Lord
s. Eventually the 
injunction was discontinued on the Attorney-General's own
 motion and the 
second article was published, differing m some respects
 to the original. 
However, the litigation continued and was referred to the 
European Court of 
Human Rights in respect of some of the original claims. 
In the European Court, Sunday Times argued that the law
 was so uncertain 
and the principles of the House of Lords decision so novel, 
that the injunction 
could not be said to be prescribed by law under Article 10
 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fund
amental Freedoms. 
The Court disagreed and said:
96 
"49. In the Court's opinion, the following are two of the 
requirements 
that flow from the expression 'prescribed by law'. F
irstly, the law 
must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be ab
le to have an 
indication that IS adequate 1 ll the circumstances of 
the legal rules 
applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be reg
arded as a 
'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to 
enable the 
96 Ibid at 524-527 
97 
98 
99 
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citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if nee
d be with 
appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasona
ble in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action m
ay entail. 
Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute
 certainty: 
experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst
 certainty is 
highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidit
y and the 
law must be able to keep pace with changing circ
umstances. 
Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms w
hich, to a 
greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpret
ation and 
application are questions of practice. 
52. To sum up, the Court does not consider that the
 applicants 
were without an indication that was adequate in the circum
stances of 
the existence of the ' prej udgment principle' . Even if the C
ourt does 
have certain doubts concerning the precision with which tha
t principle 
was formulated at the relevant time, it considers that the 
applicants 
were able to foresee, to a degree that was reasonabl
e m the 
circumstances, a risk that publication of the draft article 
might fall 
foul of the principle. " 
(ii) Scope 
In Noort, Cooke P and Richardson J
97 approved the extended meanmg to the 
phrase "prescribed by law" given by the Canadian Suprem
e Court m R v 
Thomsen.98 Le Dain J said:
99 
"The limit will be prescribed by law within the meaning of s
l [s5] if it 
is expressly provided for by the statute or regulation, or 
results by 
necessary implication from the terms of a statute or reg
ulation or 
from its operating requirements. 
application of a common law rule. " 
The limit may also result from the 
In fact, Richardson J approved the identical words of Le
 Dain J 1n R v 
Therens (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 655 at 680 
(1988) 63 CR (3d) 1 
LAW LIBRAFlY 
Ibid at 10 ;,;ornA u:11 'ER31TY U1- ·'-LLIIJ(,... Ju 
100 
101 
102 
103 
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Both judges referred to Le Dain J's "operating re
quirements" as the New 
Zealand equivalent of making an enactment work. In 
the context of the Noort 
case, the operating requirements of the Transport Act 
required a minimum of 
delay in the administration of tests for breath/blood alcohol
 levels. 100 
Where an enactment constitutes the limit on a right 
or freedom, there is no 
issue that the limit 1s prescribed by law. But wha
t of limits imposed by 
discretionary powers? It could be argued that if
 a discretionary power 
infringes a right, then the limit imposed is not presc
ribed by law. In other 
words, it is the exercise of the discretionary power th
at imposes the limit, not 
any law. The point arose in Re Ontario Film and V
ideo Appreciation Society 
and Ontario Board of Censors.
101 In this case, four films had been submitted 
to the board of censors for approval for public showin
g. The board approved 
two of the films but on a limited basis and rejecte
d the other two. The 
board's power to censor the films was under a broad
 discretion conferred by 
ss3, 35 and 38 of the Ontario Theatres Act. The 
Court found that these 
sections infringed the freedom of expression guara
nteed by s2(b) of the 
Canadian Charter. The Attorney-General argued that 
the board's authority to 
curtail freedom of expression was prescribed in law b
y ss3, 35 and 38. The 
Ontario High Court disagreed.
102 The board's powers were not sufficiently 
defined and the Court found that the limits on s2(b) 
were being infringed not 
by the law but by the exercise of the board's discr
etion. 
board's decision was quashed. 
Accordingly, the 
However, the Canadian Supreme Court has smce resol
ved the argument to the 
contrary in Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson.
103 In this case, a labour 
arbitrator's award included an order forbidding an em
ployer to reply to any 
enquiries about an former employee's employment with 
the employer except by 
a letter of reference. The Court agreed that the
 arbitrator's order violated 
the employer's freedom of expression as guaranteed in
 s2(b) of the Canadian 
Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 272- 28
3 
(1983) 41 OR (2d) 583, affirmed (1984) 45 OR (2d) 80 
Affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
(1989)59 DLR ( 4th) 416 
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Charter. However, the Court found the order was 
nevertheless a "reasonable 
limit prescribed by law" under sl of the Charter. Lamer J sa
id:104 
"However, this limitation is prescribed by law and c
an therefore be 
justified under sl. The adjudicator derives all his pow
ers from statute 
and can only do what he is allowed to do. It is t
he legislative 
provision conferring discretion which limits the right o
r freedom , since 
it is what authorises the holder of such discretion to
 make an order 
the effect of which 1s to place limits on the right
s and freedoms 
mentioned in the Charter." 
The effect of the Slaight Communications case is that 
as long as the discretion 
1s supplied by statute, such discretions are covered b
y the phrase "prescribed 
by law". It remains to be seen whether the Slaight 
Communications approach 
will be followed m New Zealand. In the write
r's view it should be. 
Otherwise, decisions made under broad statutory powers
 are unlikely to ever be 
justified under s5 as reasonable limits prescribed by la
w. This may have the 
result that an otherwise reasonable decision could be 
invalidated. Under the 
Slaight Communications approach the phrase "prescribed
 by law" is much more 
easily satisfied and therefore the Court's focus is 
rightly shifted to the 
reasonableness of the decision. 
But in the New Zealand context there is a further d
ifficulty with the phrase 
because of the operation of s4. If the rights and fr
eedoms contained in the 
bill are limited by law, and the law is expressed by an
 enactment, then s4 says 
that those limits shall prevail. Any analysis unde
r s5 is redundant. It is 
simply irrelevant whether the limit 1s unreasonable or
 cannot be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. Section 
4 says that the limiting 
enactment must be applied nevertheless. 
It is issues such as this that have confounded judges
 and commentators alike 
as to what is the proper application of s5. 
l04 Ibid at 446 
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C. Section 6 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
Given the "numbing application of s4
11105 and the uncertainty as to the role of 
s5, not surprisingly, of the three sections, s6 
has assumed increasing 
importance. Certainly Cooke P has made it clear how
 he views s6. In R v 
Phillips 106 he referred to s6 as "an important section"
.107 
said: 108 
And, in Noort he 
"Turning to s6, it is to be noted that this 1s one of 
the key features 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. It lays 
down a rule of 
interpretation comparable in importance to - perhaps 
of even greater 
importance than - s5(j) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924
 ... " 
Essentially, s6 provides a rule of interpretation for
 all enactments. 109 It 
requires, as a prerequisite to its application, that an 
enactment is capable of 
at least two meanings, one consistent with the rights 
and freedoms in the Bill 
and an another not. In such a situation, s6 m
andates what the Courts 
approach must be. If the enactment "can be given a
 meaning" consistent with 
the Bill, the Court must "prefer" that meaning to any other.
 
When one considers the unequivocal statement of legis
lative primacy m s4 and 
the peremptory directive to the Courts in s6, the im
pression is given that s6 
offers the Courts little scope in the interpretation of enactm
ents. 
PA Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law 1n Ne
w Zealand The Law Book 
Company Ltd, 1993, Sydney at 864 
[1991] 3 NZLR 175 
Ibid at 176 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 272 
See Part III A of this paper 
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However, this is illusory.
110 In fact a raft of methods of interpretation are 
available to the Courts. 111 
1. Interpreting the Bill of Rights Itself 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
The New Zealand Courts were quick to note that the Bill of
 Rights was not to 
be interpreted according to principles of interpretation app
licable to ordinary 
statutes. This is because of the very nature of declarati
ons of human rights. 
Necessarily, they are drafted ID "a broad and ample style 
which lays down 
principles of width and generality".
112 
In one of the first Supreme Court of Canada decisions 
dealing with the 
Canadian Charter, Hunter v Southam Inc, 
113 Dickson J said:114 
"The task of expounding a constitution 1s crucially different 
from that 
of construing a statute. A statute defines present
 rights and 
obligations. It 1s easily enacted and as easily re
pealed. A 
constitution, by contrast, is drafted with any eye to the fu
ture. Its 
function 1s to provide a continuing framework for the 
legitimate 
exercise of governmental power and, when joined by a 
Bill or a 
Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individ
ual rights 
and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot be easil
y repealed 
or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth and d
evelopment 
over time to meet new social, political and historical real
ities often 
unimagined by its framers." 
P Rishworth "Applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Ac
t 1990 to Statutes: 
The Right to a Lawyer in Breath and Blood Alcohol Cases" [1
991] NZ Recent L. 
Rev 337 at 344 
See J F Burrows Statute Law In New Zealand, Butterworths, 
1992, Wellington 
at 339 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319 at 328 per Lord 
Wilberforce 
[1984] 2 SCR 145 
Ibid at 155 
115 
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117 
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Or as Lord Sankey more colourfully put it:
115 
"[A constitution] is a living tree capable of growth and 
expansion 
within its natural limits." 
Accordingly, it 1s said that declarations of human rights ca
ll for a purposive 
approach: 
"The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the dec
laration of 
human rights [is] to be ascertained by an analysis of the p
urpose of 
such a guarantee; it [is] to be understood, in other words, in
 the light 
of the interests it [is] meant to protect.
11 116 
A purposive approach is to interpret the Bill of Rights gen
erously rather than 
"narrowly or technically". 1
17 Often cited as authority for a generous approach 
are the "immortal"118 words of Lord Wilberforce in Ministry o
f Home Affairs v 
Fisher.119 
"[Bill of Rights] call for a generous interpretation avoiding
 what has 
been called 'the austerity of tabulated legalism', suitable t
o give to 
individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and
 freedoms 
referred to". 120 
Therefore, it was not without significance that in the very f
irst Bill of Rights 
case to reach the Court of Appeal, Flickinger v Crown 
Colony of Hong 
Kong121 Cooke P referred to "the purpose or spirit of the Ne
w Zealand Bill of 
Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada [1930] AC 124 at 136 
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985) 18 DLR ( 4th) 321 at 359 
Cooke P in R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257 at 264 
Lord Wilberforce's statement appears to be a particular f
avourite of Cooke 
P. In Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 a
t 268 he refers to 
the statement being "destined for judicial immortality" an
d in his remarks 
at the "Bill of Rights Reports launch" (1993) NZLJ 123 at 1
24 he refers to 
the statement as "an immortal note". 
[1980] AC 319 
Ibid at 328 
[1991] 1 NZLR 439 
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Rights Act"122 thereby heralding that the New Zealan
d courts should adopt a 
purposive approach. 
2. The frozen concepts approach 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
The adoption of a purposive approach to interpreting
 the Bill of Rights has 
been to reject its antithesis, the "frozen concepts" ap
proach. The expression 
comes from Canada where it was used to describe the 
approach of some judges 
to the Canadian Bill of Rights Act.
123 That Act provided that the rights 
therein "have existed and shall continue to exist.
11124 Accordingly, some 
judges considered that the content of the rights 
10 the Act had to be 
determined in accordance with their state as in 196
0. The frozen concepts 
approach was eventually rejected by the Canadian Supr
eme Court. 125 But some 
of the early New Zealand Bill of Rights cases, referr
ing to s2 which "affirms" 
the rights in the Bill, did flirt with the concept.
126 However, now the weight 
of New Zealand authority is to reject the frozen co
ncepts approach. 
s127 Barker J noted that the Long Title to the Bill:
128 
In Re 
" ... indicates that a commitment to individual consti
tutional rights is 
not only required by international law, but that that 
commitment must 
develop." 
Ibid at 441 
As distinct from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freed
oms 1982 
Section 1 
See Curr v R (1972) 26 DLR (3d) 603 at 609 
E.g. R v Nikau (1991) 7 CRNZ 214, Minto v Police 
(1991) 7 CRNZ 38, R v 
Waddel Unreported, 25 October 1991, High Court, Au
ckland Registry, T119/91 
and R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257 
[1992] 1 NZLR 363 
Ibid at 374 
129 
130 
131 
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In Noort, Cooke P cited Barker J's judgment in Re S and s
aid:129 
"[the Bill] requires development of the law where ne
cessary. Such a 
measure 1s not to be approached as if it did not mo
re than preserve 
the status quo." 
Interestingly, in Noort the Crown specifically urged the
 Court of Appeal not to 
take a purposive approach on the ground that the Bil
l was not a constitutional 
document. The Crown sought to distinguish the 
Bill from the Bermuda 
Constitution which was the subject of the Privy Cou
ncil decision in Ministry 
of Home Affairs v Fisher. 
130 In particular, the Crown referred to the 
following passage: 131 
"When therefore it becomes necessary to interpret 
"the subsequent 
provisions of "Chapter I - in this case section 11 - t
he question must 
inevitably be asked whether the appellants' premise,
 fundamental to 
their argument, that these provisions are to be c
onstrued tn the 
manner and according to the rules which apply to Ac
ts of Parliament, 
is sound. In their Lordships' view there are two po
ssible answers to 
this. The first would be to say that, recognising t
he status of the 
Constitution as, in effect, an Act of Parliament, th
ere is room for 
interpreting it with less rigidity, and greater genero
sity, than other 
Acts, such as those which are concerned with propert
y, or succession, 
or citizenship. On the particular question this would 
require the court 
to accept as a starting point the general presump
tion that "child" 
means "legitimate child" but to recognise that this pres
umption may be 
more easily displaced. The second would be more rad
ical: it would be 
to treat a constitutional instrument such as this as su
1 generis, calling 
for principles of interpretation of its own, suitable to
 its character as 
already described, without necessary acceptance
 
presumptions that are relevant to legislation of private law. 
It is possible that, as regards the question now for
 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 270 
[1980] AC 319 
Ibid at 329 
of all the 
decision, either 
31 
method would lead to the same result. But their
 Lordships prefer the 
second." 
Instead the Crown argued that "generosity, and 
nothing more than generosity" 
is needed. 132 Cooke P thought the debate to be
 of "minimal importance" in 
the context of the Noort case
133 and Richardson J doubted whether any such 
choice had to be made.
134 Richardson J did, however, categorically endorse 
the purposive approach which he said was 
"mandated for all statutory 
interpretation in New Zealand by s5(j) of the Acts Inte
rpretation Act 1924."13
5 
3. Can Be Given A Meaning 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
How wide is the rule of interpretation that s6 giv
es the judiciary? And, what 
are the limits and criteria to which a Court 
can give a meaning to an 
enactment? Traditionally, the task of an interpr
eter is to give effect to the 
intention of Parliament. As Somers J said:
136 
"The function of the Court m relation to a statu
te is to discover the 
intention of the legislature. That intent is to be
 ascertained from the 
words it has used. But the richness of the Eng
lish language is such 
that the same words or phrases may convey diff
erent ideas depending 
upon the context and circumstances in which they
 are used. So it is 
that the words used in an enactment are to be c
onsidered m the light 
of the objects which the statute as a whole is 
intended to achieve. 
In modern legal parlance that is called a "purposiv
e" construction. But 
it has still to be stressed that the inquiry is 
not as to what the 
legislature meant to say but as to what is mean
s by what it has in 
fact said in the framework of the Act as a whole. " 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 269 
Ibid 
Ibid at 278 
Ibid 
Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR 87 at 114 
137 
138 
139 
140 
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In the event, the potency of s6 as a rule of interpretatio
n will be decided by 
the Courts themselves. Section 6 appears to 
offer ample scope for 
interpretation by the Courts. It only requires that th
e enactment in question 
can be given a meaning that is consistent with the Bill
. In the context of the 
Canadian Charter, Beetz J said the courts: 
"can do some relatively crude surgery on defi
cient legislative 
provisions, but not plastic or reconstructive surgery
11 137 
However, to date, the New Zealand courts have taken
 a much more cautious 
approach. In R v Phillips, 
138 Phillips was convicted under s6 of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act on two counts of possession of cannabis fo
r sale. Section 6(6) of 
that Act creates a presumption that, "until the contrary
 is proved", a person 1s 
deemed to be in possession of cannabis for a prohibite
d purpose where there is 
possession of 28 grams or more of cannabis. In the Cou
rt of Appeal, Phillips 
argued that the expression "until the contrary is pro
ved" in s6(6) should be 
interpreted, in accordance with s25(c) of the Bill, to 
require Phillips only to 
raise some evidential foundation sufficient to create a reason
able doubt. 
However, Cooke P was:1
39 
" ... not persuaded that the ordinary and natural mean
ing of the word 
"proof" or "proved" is capable of extending so far. 
To suggest that 
s6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act can be used in the
 sense contended 
for is, 1n our view, a strained and unnatural in
terpretation which, 
even with the aid of [s6 of] the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act, this 
Court would not be justified in adopting. " 
Accordingly, important as the rule of interpretation t
hat s6 lays down is, it 
will not allow the Courts to adopt "a strained and unnatural 
interpretation. "140 
Re Singh and MEI (1985) 17 DLR ( 4th ed) 422 at 439 
[1991] 3 NZLR 175 
Ibid at 277 
Ibid 
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And, in Knight v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
141 Hardie Boys J thought 
that:142 
"Section 6 is unlikely to be available except where th
ere 1s ambiguity 
or uncertainty." 
But, perhaps most significantly, Cooke P has int
roduced an element of 
reasonableness into the application of s6. In Noort
 he said that s6 will only 
come into play when the enactment "can reasonably 
be given [ ] a meaning 
[ consistent with the rights and freedoms in the Bill]. 
A strained interpretation 
would not be enough.
11143 
(The underlining is the writer's.) 
And, in Baigent v Attorney-General, 
144 he said:145 
"Moreover, the effect of s6 of the Bill of Righ
ts Act 1s that 
[enactments] are all to be given, so far as reason
ably possible, a 
meaning consistent with the rights affirmed in s21 [of the B
ill]" 
(Again, the underlining is the writer's.) 
So it would see that there will be little crude su
rgery done by the New 
Zealand courts using s6. 
4. Meaning 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
Perhaps of only academic interest, the use of the w
ord "meaning" in s6 was 
considered at length by Hammond J in Simpson v 
Police.146 After citing 
several distinguished philosophers of language who 
have damned the word 
(1991] 2 NZLR 30 
Ibid at 43 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 272 
Unreported, 29 July 1994, Court of Appeal, CA 207/93 
Ibid at 13 
Unreported, 17 June 1993, High Court, Hamilton Registry, 
AP 53/91 
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"meaning" as "a harlot amongst words" and noting that
 whole books have been 
written on the meaning of meaning, Hammond J rebuk
ed the drafters of the 
Bill for using the word and suggested that the word 
"construction" should be 
substituted. What practical difference this will make escape
s the writer. 
5. Preferred 
The use of the term "preferred" in s6 suggests a furt
her element of judicial 
discretion for the Courts. But the exact nature o
f the discretion remains 
unclear. What can be safely said is that it would be 
wrong for the Courts to 
prefer a consistent meaning to the Bill when it is c
lear that an inconsistent 
meaning was intended by Parliament. Unlike s5, s6 
is not expressed to be 
subject to s4. But nevertheless s4 prevails. 
6. Relationship with s5U) Acts Interpretation Act 
The exact relationship between s6 of the Bill of Righ
ts and s5(j) of the Acts 
Interpretation Act is also unclear. 
Indeed, there is a certain tension between the two sect
ions. On the one hand, 
s6 requires an interpretation of an enactment Ill acco
rdance with the Bill of 
Rights. But, on the other hand, s5(j) requires: 
such fair, large and liberal construction and interpreta
tion as will 
best ensure the attainment of the object of the A
ct and of such 
provision or enactment according to its true inten
t, meaning and 
spirit:" 
In other words, s5(j) reqmres an interpretation w
hich best furthers the 
purpose of the enactment. 
Obviously, there will be no difficulty if an interpretati
on of an enactment both 
furthers the purpose of the enactment and is consist
ent with the Bill. But 
what if the purpose of the enactment is not consistent 
with the Bill of Rights? 
Which prevails? 
In Noort Cooke P said that s6 "lays down a rule of 
interpretation comparable 
Ill importance to perhaps of even greater than 
s5(j) of the Acts 
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Interpretation Act11147 But this, m the writer' s view, 1
s doubtful. An 
interpretation which furthers the purpose of an enactment 
is more consistent 
with parliamentary primacy, which the Bill, through s4, clea
rly confirms. As 
Gault J in Noort said:148 
"It is no more and no less than an exercise Ill statutory in
terpretation 
assisted where necessary by the objects of the legislation. 
does not repeal s5(j) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924." 
Section 6 
Not that that in itself is negative. Section 5(j) mandates a 
purposive approach 
to the Bill as discussed. 1
49 But s5(j), not s6, remains the "cardinal rule of 
statutory construction in New Zealand.
11150 
7. Internationalism - A s6A? 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
A feature of the Court of Appeal's approach to the Bill of 
Rights has been its 
preparedness to draw on the experience of other jur
isdictions Ill the 
interpretation and application of similiar declarations of h
uman rights. Of 
course, this is not altogether surpnsmg. The drafters of 
the Bill drew heavily 
on the Canadian Charter and the Canadians, in turn, drew o
n the International 
Convenant and the European Convention. Obviously 
then, decisions on the 
Canadian provisions and other comparable provisions were g
oing to assist the 
New Zealand courts. This is particularly so with s5, which
 so closely follows 
sl of the Canadian Charter. 
There 1s then a concept of internationalism 10 the 
interpretation and 
application of the Bill. And, indeed, this is reinforced by 
the Long Title to 
the Bill which identifies as one of the purposes of the Bil
l "To affirm New 
Zealand's Commitment to the International Covenant on C
ivil and Political 
Rights". No better illustration is the j udgment of Hardie Bo
ys J in Baigent v 
Attorney-Generai.151 During the course of his judgment
, Hardie Boys J 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 272 
Ibid at 294 
See 133 
Police v Christie [1962] NZLR 1109 at 1112 
Unreported, 29 July 1994, Court of Appeal, CA 207/93 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
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includes references to the decisions of the courts of 
New Zealand, 152 
England, 153 Australia, 154 Canada, 
155 the United States, 156 India, 
157 Ireland, 158 
the Human Rights Committee,
159 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
160 
and the European Court of Human Rights.
161 
One might be tempted to elevate this theme of internati
onalism to be the 
equivalent of an operational provision of the Bill. A s6A i
f you like. But it 
would be a mistake to overstate this. New Zealand's Bill o
f Rights will never 
be a clone of the others. It will remain as individual as Ne
w Zealand is itself. 
As Richardson J said:162 
there are obvious differences Ill our legal and social hi
story, 
differences m societies and cultures; and a constitution
 plays a 
different role Ill a federation from an unentrenched st
atement of 
rights 
state. 
which does not override inconsistent legislation rn a 
Jurisprudence in other jurisdictions provides valuable 
but can never be determinative of New Zealand law." 
Eg, ibid at 3 
Eg, ibid 
Eg, ibid at 4 
Ibid at 20 
Ibid at 19 
Ibid at 17 
Eg, ibid at 18 
Ibid at 15 
Ibid 
Ibid at 16 
R v Jefferies [1994] 1 NZLR 290 at 299, 300 
unitary 
insights 
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF HOW THE OPERATIONAL
 SECTIONS INTERRELATE 
A. Ministry of Transport v Noort
163 
Rishworth commented:
164 
"Few Court of Appeal decisions in recent year
s were awaited with 
such keen anticipation as that in Ministry of Tran
sport v Noort; Police 
v Curran."165 
This was largely because Noort was the first cas
e in which the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal had to fully consider the 
meaning and effect of the 
operational provisions of the Bill of Rights, in par
ticular, ss4, 5 and 6. This 1s 
not to say that Noort was the first case where t
he Courts had utilised ss4, 5 
or 6. Indeed in the first Bill of Rights case to
 reach the Court of Appeal, 
Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong, 
166 the Court used s6 to help decide 
the appeai. 167 However, Noort was the first case
 where the Court of Appeal 
had to consider the operational provisions of th
e Bill in the context of an 
argument that another statute was inconsistent w
ith the Bill of Rights and 
should prevail over the Bill. 
B. The Facts of Noort 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
The facts of the Noort appeal
168 are unremarkable. Noort was apprehended 
after driving at 85 kilometres per hour in an area
 within a 50 kilometre limit. 
He was convicted of exceeding the speed limit a
nd driving while disqualified. 
No question arose Ill the Court of Appeal a
s to these two convictions. 
However, Noort was also requested to undergo 
a roadside breath screening 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 
"Two Comments on Ministry of Transport v Noort" (19
92) NZ Recent L. Rev 189. 
The two cases were heard together. 
[1991] 1 NZLR 439 
See Part VD of this paper 
The facts of the Curran appeal were different 
but the differences are not 
material here. 
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test. The test was positive. Noort was then r
equired to accompany the 
traffic officer to a police station to undergo an 
evidential breath test. That 
test showed a reading of 1000 micrograms of alco
hol per litre of breath. The 
limit was 150 micrograms for unlicensed drivers
. Noort was charged and 
convicted with driving with excess breath alcohol. 
Noort's appeal to the Court 
of Appeal was in respect of this conviction only. 
C. The Issue in Noort 
169 
170 
171 
The quite narrow issue raised by Noort was 
whether a person who was 
detained to undergo an evidential breath test or a
 blood test under ss58B and 
58C of the Transport Act must be advised of his
 or her right to consult and 
instruct a lawyer under s23(1)(b) of the Bill of Rights. 
As a starting point, it was conceded by the Crow
n that, by being detained to 
take a breath test under the Transport Act, No
ort was "detained under any 
enactment" in terms of s23(1)(b). The Crown fur
ther conceded that Noort had 
not been told of his right to "consult and instruc
t a lawyer without delay" as 
s23(1)(b) requires. 169 
Accordingly, on the face of it, there had been 
a clear violation of Noort's 
right to a lawyer protected by the Bill. 
consequence of a breach of the Bill of Rights 
cases the only evidence of intoxication is 
Ordinarily, evidence obtained in 
is ruled out. 170 Often, in such 
the breath or blood test and 
therefore this is usually fatal to the prosecution's case. 
However, in Noort's case the Crown had a furth
er argument. It was argued 
that the "operating requirements"
171 of the Transport Act excluded s23(1)(b) of 
the Bill and therefore the right to a lawyer altogether. 
In his judgment Gault J dissented that the eviden
ce did not support this 
concession, [1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 289 and 290. 
There is a line of authority for this proposition.
 
[1992] 2 NZLR 8, R v Te Kira [1993) 3 NZLR 257
 
Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 267. 
See Part III B 5(ii) of this paper 
For example, R v Kirifi 
and Ministry of Transport v 
172 
173 
174 
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In other words, the Crown argued that the right to a lawyer
 was inconsistent 
with and would not allow the effective operation of the 
testing procedures 
under the Transport Act. Therefore, pursuant to s4 of the 
Bill, s23(1)(b) was 
overridden. Or, in the alternative, exclusion of the right
 to a lawyer was 
justified in terms of s5 of the BilI.
172 
It is important to note that the Crown did not (because it 
could not) base its 
argument on any express provision of the Transport Act. 
That Act 1s silent 
on the right to a lawyer. Rather, the Crown argued th
at the right to a 
lawyer under s23(1)(b) of the Bill was overridden by the 
Transport Act by 
implication. The High Court in both the Noort and Curran 
cases had accepted 
this argument. And there had been previous cases wh
ere this kind of 
argument on behalf of the Crown had been successful. For
 example, rn R v 
Waddel173, Waddel was charged with importing heroin into 
New Zealand and 
was strip searched under s18 the Misuse of Drugs Act. Thom
as J found on the 
facts of the case that Waddel: 
(i) had been detained under an enactment; and 
(ii) had not been informed of his right to a lawyer under s23
(1)(b). 
However, Thomas J accepted that the operating requirements of
 the powers of 
search under the Misuse of Drugs Act would be impaired if 
Waddel had to be 
given access to a lawyer. He found that s18 of Misus
e of Drugs Act was 
inconsistent with s23(1)(b) of the Bill of Rights. In the c
ircumstances it was 
not possible to confer the s23(1)(b) right and still give eff
ect to Parliament's 
intention in enacting the Misuse of Drugs Act and thus 
give s18 its true 
meaning. 174 
See text accompanying n181 
Unreported, 25 October 1991, High Court, Auckland Registry, T 1
19/91 
Ibid at 22. Presumably by the use of the word "inconsis
tent" Thomas J rn 
fact used s4 to reach this decision. However, at 22 he 
says that "ss4, 5 
and 6, read collectively" brought him to his decision. 
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D. The Result in Noort 
In the Noort case the Court of Appeal rejected the Crow
n's argument. Despite 
the dissenting judgment of Gault J, there was agreem
ent, more or less, as to 
the result. The Court quashed Noort' s conviction 
based on bis evidential 
breath test. 
However the Court could not agree on the respective 
roles of ss4, 5 and 6 of 
the Bill. In particular, the role of s5 caused the m
ost difficulty. The five 
judges divided four ways (arguably three) as to their 
reason10g. As Risbwortb 
commented:175 
"As it turns out Noort raises as many questions as it answers
. " 
E. The Essential Problem with the Operational Provis
ions 
175 
176 
It may assist if we remind ourselves what is the dif
ficulty in all this. The 
essential problem 1s that s4 of the Bill provides that 
if another enactment 1s 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights then that other 
enactment prevails. In 
particular, s4 prohibits possible judicial responses to inconsi
stent legislation. 
Section 5 of the Bill provides that the rights and free
doms 10 the Bill are not 
absolute. They are subject to reasonable limits pre
scribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society
. As Richardson J said: 
176 
"(Section 5] reflects the reality that rights do not exi
st 10 a vacuum, 
that they may be modified in the public interest to 
take account of 
the rights of others and of interests of the whole community
". 
The difficulty is that s5 has been made subject to s4
. Unlike s5, s4 bas no 
criteria of reasonableness. Therefore, while s5 provi
des that only reasonable 
limits to the Bill are permitted, s4 permits any kind 
of limits to override the 
Bill whether reasonable or not. Therefore, in theor
y, at its most extreme, s4 
"Two comments on Ministry of Transport v Noort" (1992
) NZ Recent L. Rev. 189 
at 190 
(1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 283 
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permits Parliament to pass legislation enabling the murde
r and torture of 
people contrary to ss8 and 9 of the Bill. 
As a result, two of the judges rn Noort (Cooke P a
nd Gault J) had 
reservations about the role of s5 and whether in fact it was
 relevant at all to 
their task of deciding between two arguably inconsistent st
atutes. 177 
event, they decided the appeal without recourse to s5 at all. 
In the 
However for the other three judges (Richardson, Hardie Boys 
and McKay JJ) s5 
was instrumental in their reasoning. Although Hardie Boy
s J differed again 
(albeit slightly) in his approach. 
F. An Analysis of the Reasoning of Cooke P 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
Cooke P's approach was premised by his preliminary finding
 that the issue in 
Noort was simply one of inconsistency between two statutes, 
the Transport Act 
and the Bill of Rights. 1
78 Accordingly, he held that that issue fell to be 
determined under ss4 and (if necessary) 6 of the Bill.
179 
Cooke P did not think that any question for the Court arose 
under sS. 18° For 
him, s5 was a section stating when the rights and freedom
s contained in the 
Bill may acceptably be made subject to limits. But, 
as no interpretation 
involving a limitation of the rights in the Bill had been argu
ed by the Crown, 
it was therefore unnecessary for him to form a committed o
pinion on the role 
of sS. 181 
For Cooke P the role of s5 was limited to two situations.
182 
Ibid at 271 and 295 
Ibid at 273 
Ibid 
Ibid at 271 
However, this is at odds with Richardson J's judgment whic
h at 282 refers to 
the Crown's submission that the exclusion of the right to
 a lawyer during 
the course of the testing process was justified in terms of s5. 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 273 
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(i) when the common law imposes a limit on a right; and 
(ii) when the Attorney-General reports to the House of
 Representatives as 
required by s7 of the Bill. 
Cooke P held that the breath testing provisions of the Trans
port Act were not 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. He said that the testing
 procedures would 
not be substantially impaired by the time required to give
 drivers a limited 
opportunity of making telephone contact with a lawyer and 
taking advice. He 
said that in relation to evidential breath tests and blood t
ests the two Acts 
can "reasonably stand together".
183 
G. An Analysis of the Reasoning of Gault I 
183 
184 
185 
186 
Like Cooke P, Gault J did not consider that s5 was relevant 10 
the Noort case. 
However, unlike Cooke P, Gault J did not articulate a d
istinction as to 
whether the issue was one of inconsistency (so as to be de
termined under ss4 
and 6) or one of limits on rights (so as to be determined und
er s5). For Gault 
J the correct approach was to apply established rules
 of statutory 
interpretation. 184 
First, he said s6 should be applied. If the prov1s10ns of the 
Transport Act can 
be construed so as to be consistent with s23(1)(b) of the 
Bill that must be 
done. But in this case, Gault J found that any reasonable 
interpretation of 
the Transport Act provisions was inconsistent with the ful
l and unrestricted 
right to consult and instruct a lawyer.
185 He found no role for s5 to assist in 
the circumstances:186 
"Where on a proper interpretation of a New Zealand statute 
there is a 
limit imposed upon a fundamental right, it is no part of th
e function 
of the Courts to examine whether that limit can be justif
ied. The 
limit must be given effect to as directed by s4". 
Ibid at 274 
Ibid at 294 and 296 
Ibid at 294. This finding is of course completely contrary to Cook
e P's. 
Ibid at 295 
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Gault J, like Cooke P, suggested a limited role for s5:
187 
"[Section 5] seems rather directed to the role of the Attorney Gen
eral 
under s7. It may assist in a conflict between common law rules 
and 
the fundamental rights, but I can see no part for it to play in c
ases 
of statutory inconsistency." 
After repeating his view that the correct course is to approach ea
ch case by 
applying the established rules of statutory interpretation Gault J said:
188 
"If taking into account the direction m s6 that statutes are to b
e 
given meanings consistent with the rights and freedoms contained
 m 
the Bill of Rights Act, a particular statutory provision prop
erly 
interpreted 1s inconsistent with full enjoyment of such a right 
or 
freedom, the statutory provision must be given effect and the right
 or 
freedom will remain only to the extent that it too can be given ef
fect 
to." 
In the event Gault J agreed with the other judges that a limited 
right to 
consult a lawyer by telephone existed. By Gault J's analysis such 
a right was 
a residual one that remained after the provisions of the Transpo
rt Act had 
been given effect to. He said that such a right was "sensible"
189 and "accords 
with fairness" 190. 
H. An Analysis of the Reasoning of Richardson J
191 
187 
188 
189 
190 
191 
192 
In contrast to Cooke P and Gault J, Richardson J found a much mor
e generous 
role for s5 and relegated s4 to being sequentially the third of
 the three 
sections to be considered. He said:
192 
Ibid 
Ibid at 296 
Ibid 
Ibid 
McKay J's judgment is very short and he simply concurs with Richardson
 J 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 282 
193 
194 
195 
196 
197 
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"In such a case [as Noort] it 1s more consistent with the purposes of 
the Bill of Rights Act to resort to s4 only if the challenged action 
cannot be justified in terms of ss5 and 6. But it is not immediately 
apparent whether the Court should turn first to s5 or to s6." 
After expressing a tentative and obviously obiter view on the role of s6, that 
it is designed to soften where possible the potential impact of s4, Richardson J 
thought "logically" s5 was the first of the three sections that should be 
applied. 193 
Richardson J found that the "operating requirements" of the Transport Act did 
impose limits on the right to a lawyer. By "operating requirements" he meant 
that it was implicit in the breath testing procedures that there should be no 
unreasonable delay in carrying through the statutory processes.
194 
the full right to a lawyer would delay the testing process. 
Necessarily 
Applying Canadian precedent195 , Richardson J found that limits imposed by the 
"operating requirements" of an Act are limits "prescribed by law" as provided 
for in s5. In this situation, the operating requirements of the Transport Act 
limited the right to consult a lawyer to be by telephone only. However, such 
a limit was reasonable and could be demonstrably justified in terms of s5.
196 
Accordingly: 
Ibid 
the breath/blood alcohol provisions are not inconsistent with the 
Bill of Rights Act provisions for the right to a lawyer within any 
justifiable limits prescribed by law under s5"197 
Ibid at 284 
R v Therens (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 655 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 285 
Ibid 
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I. An Analysis of the Reasoning of Hardie Boys J 
The reasomng of Hardie Boys J IS not dissimilar to that of Richardson J. 
However, while Richardson J reached his conclusion by applying s5 alone, 
Hardie Boys J thought:198 
"The Part I sections particularly ss4, 5 and 6 must be read as a whole. 
Only then, I think, is the true significance of s5, otherwise a difficult 
provision, apparent." 
However, like Richardson J, Hardie Boys J gave primacy to s5 and described it 
as having "a reconciling or bridging role between the two sections between 
which it is placed, s4 and s6.11199 
For Hardie Boys J the role of s4 was limited: 
"Thus rn terms of s4 there will be inconsistency between an enactment 
and a right or freedom only if after construing it in accordance with 
s6 there Is no room within it for the right or freedom even rn 
modified or abridged form. 11200 
As if responding to the judgment of Gault J, Hardie Boys J went on to 
say:201 
"To view the matter rn this way is no arrogation by the Court of the 
responsibility of determining what is a reasonable limit, and what can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Rather it 
is to see s5 as a mechanism to secure recognition of the Act's rights 
and freedoms to the fullest extent that is reasonable and practicable 
in a specific statutory context." 
198 Ibid at 287 
199 Ibid 
200 Ibid 
20l Ibid 
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Hardie Boys J agreed with Richardson J that a limited right to consult 
a 
lawyer by telephone would not be inconsistent with the Transport Act
's 
operating requirements. 
J. Comments on the Reasoning of Cooke P and Gault J. 
It is difficult to ascertain from Cooke P's j udgment how, having dismissed s5 
as being irrelevant, he came to his result. Necessarily Cooke P interprete
d 
s23(1)(b) of the Bill to mean, in the context of breath testing procedures, 
a 
right to consult a lawyer by telephone only. Such a right is obviously 
a 
limited right. A full right might include the right to consult a lawyer 1
0 
person before any of the testing procedures may continue. Therefore
, 
notwithstanding his preliminary finding (that the issue in the case was abou
t 
"inconsistency" rather than "limits on rights"), Cooke P obviously found tha
t 
the Transport Act did impose limits on the right to a lawyer. But how di
d 
Cooke P formulate these limits? Obviously it was not by s5's test o
f 
reasonableness. Instead Cooke P's formulation seems to be, in the context o
f 
breath testing procedures, by what extent the two Acts "can reasonably stan
d 
together." Such an analysis does not accord with ss4 and 6 of the Bill. And
, 
it seems odd one might have thought, when s5 offers the Bill's own test o
f 
reasonableness, that Cooke P should prefer his own formulation as to th
e 
extent that the rights in the Bill might be limited. 
The same criticism can be made of Gault J's judgment. While, unlike Cooke P
, 
he found in terms of s6 the two statutes were inconsistent, and by s4 th
e 
Transport Act prevailed, he still found a residual right to consult a lawyer b
y 
telephone. But on what basis did this residual right remain? Gault 
J 
comments that such a residual right was sensible and accords with fairness
. 
But obviously they were not the tests that he applied. 
In the event all the judges in the Court of Appeal came to the same resul
t. 
But the approach of Cooke P and Gault J was by some unexplained evaluation 
of what should remain of s23(1)(b) of the Bill after applying the provisions o
f 
the Transport Act. 
47 
K. Comments on the Reasoning of Richardson and Hardie Boys JJ 
202 
203 
204 
The primary criticism of the reasoning of the Richardson and Har
die Boys JJ 
is, made by Cooke P and Gault J, that if the law
202 imposes a limit on a right 
10 the Bill, it is no function of the Court to examine whether t
hat limit is 
reasonable or not. The law is the law and, by s4, it must be applied. 
In his judgment Cooke P expounded further arguments rejecting a 
broader role 
for s5. He suggested that it was simply not the role of s5 to int
erpret other 
enactments. Rather, s5 sets down a rule of substance as to when
 the rights 
and freedoms in the Bill may acceptably be made subject to limits
. 
words, s6 provides the rule for interpreting other enactments, s5 does not.
 
In other 
A further argument 1s from the wording of the sections themse
lves "which 
cannot be ignored. 203 The Bill of Rights refers to itself in two diff
erent ways. 
Section 4 uses the words "any provision of this Bill of Rights" whil
e ss5 and 6 
[and 7) use the words "the rights and freedoms contained 10 t
his Bill of 
Rights". If one assumes that the distinction is deliberate and is intend
ed to 
mean something, what then is a "provision" of the Bill if it not the
 rights and 
freedoms themselves? The argument follows that a "provision" m
ust be a right 
or freedom after the application of s5. In other words a "provision
" is a right 
or freedom subject to reasonable limits as opposed to a right or fre
edom in its 
absolute form. 
But s6, the only section of the Bill which clearly by its wording
 1s directed 
towards the interpretation of other enactments, refers to the 
rights and 
freedoms in their absolute form. If s6 had required an enactment to be 
given 
a meaning consistent with "any provision" of th e Bill , only then wo
uld s5 have 
a function to influence the relationship between the Bill of Right
s and other 
enactm eats. 204 
Which includes the operating requirements of a statute, see Par
t III B of 
this paper 
Cooke P in [1992) 3 NZLR 260 at 273 
This reasoning is more fully developed by Fisher J 10 H erewini v MOT
 [1990-
92) 3 NZBORR 113 at 140 than by Cooke P in Noort 
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V. AN ANALYSIS OF CASES THAT HAVE APPLIED SECTIONS 
4, 5 and 6 
Fortunately, Bill of Rights cases of the complexity of Noort have 
been few. 
But, ss4, 5 and 6 have featured in many cases on the Bill. This p
art of this 
paper will then give more specific consideration to how the Courts
 have been 
applying the three sections. 
A. Collectively 
205 
206 
207 
208 
209 
It has to be accepted that there is certain attraction, rather than
 attempting 
to analysis the three sections individually, 10 lumping them to
gether and 
considering them as a whole. 
Certainly that was the approach of Hardie Boys J in Noort. Ac
cording to 
Hardie Boys J, by reading the three sections together, only t
hen, did the 
significance of s5 become apparent. 
205 With respect to Hardie Boys J 
subsequent analysis, 206 there IS nothing particularly apparent 
about s5. As 
much of this paper has attempted to show, s5 IS a difficult 
section. In the 
event, Hardie Boys J found a generous role for s5, 
207 but it is difficult to 
follow how, in fact, reading the three sections as a whole assist
ed him to 
coming to that decision. In the writer's view, Hardie Boys J's app
roach is to 
accept that an intricate analysis of the three sections may not be 
helpful or, 
indeed, even necessary. 
Similarly, 10 R v Waddel208 Thomas J found that a person who is detai
ned for 
a search under the Misuse of Drugs Act is detained under an ena
ctment for 
the purposes of s23(1) of the Bill. Therefore, such a person should 
be advised 
of his or her right to consult a lawyer. However, the Cour
t found that the 
Misuse of Drugs Act was "inconsistent
11 209 with the Bill and therefore no 
breach of the Bill had occurred. 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 287 
Ibid 
As such, the case seems to be a clear, 
As opposed to the limited role that Cooke P and Gault J suggested 
Unreported, 25 October 1991, High Court, Auckland Registry, T 119/91 
Ibid at 22 
49 
though arguably unnecessary, 
210 application of s4. But Thomas J did not 
identify the section that he relied upon to come to his dec
ision. Instead, he 
simply referred to ss4, 5 and 6 and said that he did not nee
d to pursue their 
ultimate meaning. Rather he passed the observation that
 read collectively, 
they mean that the Bill of Rights is paramount unless 
contrary legislation 
prevails. 211 
B. Unnecessary Use of Section 4 
210 
211 
212 
213 
214 
215 
216 
If by the operation of s5, the Bill of Rights only gua
rantees rights and 
freedoms in their limited form, then it can be argued that i
t is unnecessary to 
use s4 when enactments are really 
Waddel212 provides a good example. 
only imposing reasonable limits. R V 
Rather than finding that the Misuse of 
Drugs Act was "inconsistent" with the Bill, it is arguable th
at equally Thomas 
J could have found that the Misuse of Drugs Act prescribed 
a reasonable limit 
on the right to consult a lawyer using s5. Another ex
ample is Police v 
Temese. 213 In this case the Court of Appeal had to consider
 whether or not a 
suspected drink-driving offender being dealt with at the roa
dside is entitled to 
consult a lawyer under s23(1)(b) of the Bill of Rights. 
The judgment of 
Richardson, Casey, Hardie Boys and Gault JJ was delivered by 
Casey J. They 
agreed that, while such a person is "detained", for the pur
poses of s23(1)(b), 
the provisions of the Transport Act relating to prelimina
ry inquiries as to 
identity and breath screenrng of suspected drunk drivers
 at the roadside 
constitute justified limitations under s5 to the right to leg
al advice. 214 As 
such the New Zealand approach to this question was the sam
e as in Canada. 215 
However, Casey J went on to state that, moreover, the applicat
ion of s23(1)(b) 
of the Bill would render "ineffective" those provisions of 
the Transport Act 
within the meaning of s4(a) of the Bili.
216 Cooke P delivered a separate 
See Part V B of this paper 
Unreported, 25 October 1991, High Court, Auckland Registry, T11
9/91 at 22 
Ibid 
(1992) 9 CRNZ 425 
Ibid at 431 
R v Thomsen (1988) 63 CR (3d) 1 
(1992) 9 CRNZ 425 at 431 
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j udgment and while stating that he largely agreed
217 with the majority, 
consistent with his j udgment in Noort, he went on to add t
hat while the limit 
on s23(1)(b) imposed by the provisions of the Transport Act 
may be reasonable 
under s5, in any event, by virtue of s4, those provisions had to pre
vail. 218 
Another example again is TV3 Network Services Ltd V 
R.219 Equally, it is 
argued that the Court of Appeal could have found that t
he prohibition of the 
publication of the names of offenders and victims tn 
sexual cases was a 
justified limit on the freedom of expression guaranteed by s14 of 
the Bill. 
It is suggested that in such cases no reference to s4 need 
be made. And it 
certainly assists to make some sense of the application of 
ss4 and 5, if any 
application of s4 requires, as a prerequisite, that a right or f
reedom in the Bill 
has been unreasonably overridden. 
C. Section 5 in Operation 
217 
218 
219 
220 
221 
As we have already discussed, 
220 the j udgments of Cooke P and Gault J in 
Noort include powerful dicta to say that the role of s
5 ts limited and 
peripheral. Nevertheless, there have been a number of
 cases where the Courts 
have not questioned s5's role and, indeed, have used it as a
n integral part of 
their decision making process. 
A good illustration is the significant decision of the High C
ourt in Federated 
Farmers of New Zealand & Ors v New Zealand Post Ltd.
221 In this case, 
Federated Farmers sought to resist an rncrease in the rur
al delivery service 
fee charged to farmers by New Zealand Post. The 
fee was payable under 
contract by farmers as a condition of delivery of mail "to 
the gate" in rural 
areas. While the proposed increase was only from $
40 to $80 per annum, 
Ibid at 426 
Ibid at 427 
[1993] 3 NZLR 421. See Part III A 2 of this paper 
See Part IVF and G of this paper 
Unreported, 1 December 1992, High Court, Wellington Registry, C
P 661/92 
222 
223 
224 
225 
226 
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beneath the sums involved were "deeper concerns".
222 There was concern on 
the part of the rural comm unity at a perceived erosion 
of traditional rural 
services. 
Included 10 a raft of causes of action, Federated Farmer
s pleaded that, by 
requiring payment of the rural delivery service fee as a c
ondition of farmers 
receiving their mail, the fee was in breach of s14 of t
he Bill of Rights. 
McGechan J had little difficulty finding that "the mails" fell 
within s14223 and 
that New Zealand Post fell within s3.
224 But, the more difficult question was 
New Zealand Post's argument that the limitation placed
 upon rural gate 
delivery by requiring contractual agreement and a fee of $
80 for the service 
was a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonst
rably justified in a 
free and democratic society. 
225 
As to the burden McGechan J agreed it fell to New Zealand P
ost and as to the 
standard, he said:226 
"Suffice it to say, 10 principle, the Court is not likely to 
allow such 
fundamental rights as those in the Bill of Rights to be displ
aced under 
s5 without a clear case made out, and bearing in mind the
 hurdle of 
showing limits postulated are "demonstrably" justified. " 
In this case, the "limits" were the requirement to c
ontract, and more 
particularly, the rural delivery service fee. But were th
ese limits "reasonable" 
and "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society?
" On the facts of 
the case, McGechan J thought so: 
"It is reasonable, and within the parameters of the justifiable
 in a free 
and democratic society to impose a degree of "user pays" 
even upon 
essential services. There is no undying democratic princ
iple all such 
Ibid at 2 
Ibid at 54 
Ibid at 54, 55 
In other words, within s5 
0221 at 56 
52 
must be provided free of charge - which rn our society me
ans at the 
expense of others or all. 1
1 227 
McGechan J went on to say:22
8 
"When established as "reasonable limits" such still must be sh
own to be 
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". 
This is a 
further narrowing. It would be possible to conclude in some
 cases, on 
a fine balance, a fee was a "reasonable limit, but to say "oh 
well, it is 
reasonable, 
otherwise". 
I suppose it can be justified, 
That would not do. The 
though many might think 
limits must not only be 
"reasonable", and "justifiable", but "demonstrably justifiable"." 
While commenting that, on occasions, the Courts will be 
required to make 
difficult assessments involving value judgments and s
ocial balances, 229 
McGechan J did not think the case before him difficult. It wa
s reasonable and 
demonstrably justifiable for New Zealand Post to charge
 rural dwellers a 
modest fee to have the convenience of gate delivery. 
Furthermore, referring to the Court of Appeal 's decision in 
R v Mallinson, 230 
the "reality" of the situation had to be considered. McGechan J concl
uded:231 
"I consider the reality is that an RDSF [rural delivery serv
ice fee] is 
necessary and appropriate, and does not m practical term
s impede 
freedom of expression. In the circumstances, that limit 
so placed on 
the utmost exercise of freedom of expression is not only 
reasonable, 
but demonstrably justified in our free and democratic society." 
(The emphasis is McGechan J's) 
227 Ibid 
228 Ibid at 57 
229 
230 
231 
Ibid. Here, McGechan J referred to the judgment of Richards
on J m Noort. 
Implicit is a rejection of a limited role for s5. 
Unreported, 30 September 1992, Court of Appeal , CA 229/92 
n221 at 58 
232 
233 
234 
235 
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The final issue was whether the limits concerned were 
"prescribed by law". In 
this case, the limits were the requirement to contract 
and the fee. McGechan 
J found that the source of the limits was the State-
Owned Enterprises Act 
1986 and, in particular, s4(1) of the Act which requir
ed New Zealand Post to 
carry on a "successful business". "In any ordinary sense
, [s4(1)] "prescribes" a 
commercial course of conduct, and inherent within th
at the imposition of 
commercially necessary charges. There is foundation I
ll law. While there are 
not actual express words of grant, specifically dire
cted to the matter, 
realistically charges can only be regarded as so "presc
ribed".232 Accordingly, 
Federated Farmers' cause of action under the Bill of Rights 
did not succeed. 
Another illustration of s5 m operation IS the Court of 
Appeal's decision in R v 
Accused (CA 421/93).
233 In this case, the accused was committed for trial on 
charges of burglary and rape. The complainant, the ac
cused's former wife, had 
made a sworn statement, in accordance with s185C of 
the Summary Proceedings 
Act, which was admitted as evidence at the prelimin
ary hearing. Sadly, she 
committed suicide prior to the trial and, obviously, 
there was no longer an 
opportunity to cross-examine her evidence. Howeve
r, the High Court declined 
to exclude her statement from the Crown's evidence a
nd the accused appealed 
to the Court of Appeal. The question raised by t
he appeal was in what 
circumstances was it proper, as a matter of discr
etion, to allow such a 
statement to be read at trial. 
The answer turned on the application of ss184 and 
185C of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957 and ss3 and 18 of the Evidence 
Amendment Act (No. 2) 
1980, to be considered in the context of the stand
ards of criminal justice 
under the Bill of Rights. In delivering the Court o
f Appeal's234 j udgment, 
Richardson J said:235 
n221 at 59 
(1993) 11 CRNZ 8 
Perhaps significantly the coram was Richardson, Casey and 
McKay JJ. 
n233 at 17 
54 
"The Bill of Rights is a legislative commitment to th
e protection and 
promotion of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
set out rn the 
statute. In setting "minimum standards of criminal 
procedure" there 
can be no doubt where that legislative emphasis lie
s rn this case. 
They are "minimum rights". Anyone charged with an 
offence has the 
right to a fair trial [s25(a)] and the right to cr
oss-examine the 
witnesses for the prosecution (s25(f)]." 
Richardson J noted that the common law, the Bill of Rig
hts and the European 
Convention on Human Rights all emphasise the role 
of cross-examination rn 
ensuring fair trials. And, against that background, the
re was every reason for 
the Court to exercise its discretion under s184 of t
he Summary Proceedings 
Act to ensure conformity with s25(a) and (f) of the Bili.
236 However:237 
"In harmony with the justified limitations on the spec
ified rights and 
freedoms recognised by s5, the Court may properly ass
ess the practical 
implications of the absense of an opportunity for cros
s-examination rn 
the particular case. It is not enough for an acc
used to assert a 
defence and desire to cross-examine to support the 
defence. The 
likely veracity of the complainant's statemen
t JS a crucial 
consideration." 
On the facts of the case the Court concluded that 
there was no basis for 
giving any substantial weight to the absence of an
 opportunity to cross-
examine the complainant. Accordingly, the appeal was dism
issed. 
The two cases discussed illustrate the appropriateness o
f using s5 to read down 
the rights and freedoms in the Bill. The cases are 
but two more reminders 
that the rights and freedoms in the Bill are not abso
lute. Not that there is 
anything particularly magical about s5. It will often 
be to do no more than 
what the Courts would do anyway, as the judgments of 
Cooke P and Gault J in 
Noort well illustrate. But, there is then a choice. W
hether to use the criteria 
that is s5, or some other criteria which, to date, has 
not been articulated. In 
236 Ibid at 18 
237 Ibid 
55 
the event, perhaps the best argument ta favour of u
stng s5 1s that there 1s 
simply no good reason not to apply it.
238 
D. Application of Section 6 
238 
239 
240 
241 
242 
The potential of s6 is no better illustrated than in the 
first Bill of Rights case 
to be considered by the Court of Appeal, Flickinger v
 Crown Colony of Hong 
Kong. 239 In this case, Flickinger was committed to pr
ison under the Fugitive 
Offenders Act 1881 (UK) to await extradition to Ho
ng Kong where he was 
wanted to face various charges of fraud. Flickinger 
made an application to 
the High Court for (inter alia) habeas corpus which wa
s declined. He appealed 
to the Court of Appeal claiming a right to appeal und
er s66 of the Judicature 
Act 1908. Flickinger's argument was based on s23(
1)(c) of the Bill which 
provides: 
"Everyone who is ... detained under any enactment -
(c) Shall have the right to have the validity of 
the ... detention 
determined without delay by way of habeas corpus an
d to be released 
if the ... detention is not lawful." 
At first blush Flickinger's right to appeal to the 
Court of Appeal had 
formidable obstacles. Since 1900
240 there had been a long line of authority 
that had held that a habeas corpus application is a cri
minal matter and s66 of 
the Judicature Act did not confer a right of app
eal rn criminal matters. 
Indeed, as recently as in 1985 in R v Clarke
241 Cooke P had said that a 
similar argument was:
242 
plainly untenable. It is altogether inconsistent with 
statutory 
patterns and New Zealand legal history". 
n164 at 200 
[1991] 1 NZLR 439 
Ex Parte Bouvy (No 3) (1990) 18 NZLR 608 
[1985]2 NZLR 212 
Ibid at 214 
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But only five years later, now armed with s6 of the 
Bill of Rights, the Court 
of Appeal revisited the issue. While not actually
 deciding the question, 
Cooke P said:243 
we see force in the argument that, to give full me
asure to the 
rights specified in s23(1)( c), s66 of the Judicature 
Act should now 
receive a wider interpretation than has prevailed hitherto." 
In the event, 
disturbing the 
only obiter. 
been expressly 
the Court of Appeal found that there were no gro
unds for 
lower court judgments and, therefore, Cooke P's co
mment is 
But if s6 can bring the Courts to accept an argumen
t that had 
considered and rejected for nearly a century, then 
it is a 
potent tool indeed. 
However, as discussed earlier m this paper
244 more recent and perhaps more 
considered cases on s6 have suggested a more conse
rvative approach to the 
application to s6. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
243 
244 
In four short years our Bill of Rights has become an
 integral part of New 
Zealand law. As such, those who originally demea
ned the Bill have been 
proved wrong. But that is not to say that the pa
th forged by the Bill into 
our jurisprudence has not been without difficulty. 
An unentrenched Bill of 
Rights will always carry the stigma that it should be 
no more than any other 
Act of Parliament. 
At the centre of any debate about the role of t
he rights and freedoms 
contained in the Bill will be the operational provisions, 
ss4, 5 and 6. After all 
these are the provisions that tell you how the Bill actu
ally works. And how it 
fits into our legal system. But, as this paper has 
attempted to show, the 
application of these provisions has proved to be diff
icult. Individually, and 
[1991] 1 NZLR 439 at 441 
See Part III C of this paper 
245 
57 
somewhat superficially, the three sections have been referred to by 
the Courts 
with alacrity. 
answer. 
But any analysis of how the sections interrelate defies a ready 
One might well ask, does any of this really matter? After all, ever
y day, our 
Courts are managing to apply the Bill to any number of fact situati
ons without 
undue concern. Indeed, for all the complexity of the Noort decision,
 all the 
judges in the Court of Appeal came to the same answer, albeit b
y differing 
routes. 
But it is suggested that it is surely unsatisfactory that there shou
ld be such 
uncertainty over what is such a crucial part of our Bill of Rights. 
Our Bill is 
New Zealand's most obvious commitment to the protection of ba
sic human 
rights and freedoms. 
should they be fixed. 
democratic society. 
But these rights and freedoms are not absolute. Nor 
A Bill of Rights must be adaptable in a free and 
At the heart of every right and freedom there 1s a conflict. 
What 1s a 
justified limit on any such right or freedom? 
was the right to consult a lawyer, "part 
In the case of Noort the right 
of our basic constitutional 
inheritance". 245 But, on the other hand, our road toll causes en
ormous costs, 
both financial and ID human suffering. Drinking and driving 
1s a lethal 
combination. Few would deny the importance of protecting ou
r roads from 
alcohol impaired drivers. The testing procedures in the Transpor
t Act are an 
integral part of that protection. 
The judges ID Noort agreed that the operating requirements of 
the testing 
procedures ID the Transport Act could not co-exist with suspec
ted drivers 
having the full and absolute right to consult a lawyer. If then a 
right is to 
be limited, the test as to what should be that limit should be 
open and 
certain. After all the very integrity of the rights and freedoms ID 
the Bill is 
threatened. 
Richardson J in [1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 279 
58 
While it has to be conceded that there are formidable textual arguments 
against s5 having such a role, at least s5 offers a discernable test for the 
assessment of limits. Otherwise the task is left to the subjective viewpoint of 
an individual judge. The rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights are simply 
too important for that. 
rights. 
Even more so what are to be the limits on those 
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